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Abstract
U.S. trading in non-U.S. stocks has grown dramatically. Round-the-clock,
these stocks trade in the home market, in the U.S. market and, potentially,
in both markets simultaneously. We use a state space model to study 24-hour
price discovery. As opposed to the standard “variance ratio” approach, this
model deals naturally with (i) simultaneous quotes in an overlap, (ii) missing
observations in a non-overlap, (iii) noise due to transitory microstructure
eﬀects, and (iv) contemporaneous correlation in returns due to market-wide
factors. Our ﬁndings suggest a minor role for the NYSE in price discovery
for Dutch shares, in spite of its non-trivial and growing market share. The
results diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the variance ratio approach.
In the last decade, international ﬁrms have increasingly sought a U.S. list-
ing, oftentimes achieved through cross-listing their shares at either the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or at the NASDAQ. At the end of 2000, 420
non-U.S. ﬁrms were listed at the NYSE and generated approximately 15%
of total volume that year. The NASDAQ lists even more non-U.S. ﬁrms.
This trend has prompted many academic studies. Most of them focus on the
beneﬁts of cross-listings, such as reduced cost of capital and enhanced liq-
uidity of a ﬁrm’s stock (see, e.g., Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan(1987,
1988), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Karolyi (1998), Domowitz, Glen, and
Madhavan (1998), Pagano, Roe¨ll, and Zechner (2002), and Miller (1999)).
A relatively unexplored question is how much U.S. trading contributes to
price discovery over and above domestic trading. Reasoning could go both
ways. On the one hand, the home market being closest to the company’s
headquarters and, therefore, closest to where information is produced, may
be most important (see, e.g., Bacidore and Soﬁanos (2002), Hau (2001), and
Solnik (1996)). On the other hand, U.S. stock exchanges being the largest
and most liquid exchanges in the world may imply an important role in
price discovery also for non-U.S. stocks, particularly now that their share in
total U.S. volume is rapidly increasing. Chan, Hameed, and Lau (2003), for
example, ﬁnd that trading location matters irrespective of business location
for a group of companies that changed listing from Hong Kong to Singapore.
Empirical methodology for measuring contributions to price discovery
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was ﬁrst developed for U.S. stocks trading on the NYSE as well as on re-
gional U.S. exchanges (see Hasbrouck (1995), Harris et al. (1995)). The
methodology was further developed in subsequent years and surveyed in a
special issue of the Journal of Financial Markets edited by Bruce Lehmann
(2002, 5:3). The ﬁnding in U.S. studies that the NYSE dominates regional
exchanges in price discovery is very interesting, but not surprising. The ques-
tion of whether NYSE dominance extends to non-U.S. stocks cross-listed in
the U.S. is more intriguing, as these stocks are now trading on exchanges in
diﬀerent countries and, possibly, diﬀerent time-zones.
Recent evidence indicates that although both markets contribute to price
discovery, the domestic market dominates. Studies on Dutch, German, and
Spanish stocks show that the contribution of the NYSE is at most one-
third (see Hupperets and Menkveld (2002), Grammig, Melvin, and Schlag
(2001), and Pascual, Pascual-Fuste, and Climent (2001)). Eun and Sab-
herwal (2003) analyze 62 Canadian stocks and ﬁnd that U.S. prices adjust
more to Canadian prices than vice-versa for the majority of stocks. Cross-
sectional analysis further shows that the U.S. contribution is increasing in
its share in total volume. These papers focus on price discovery for the
overlapping period. For most non-U.S. stocks, however, this is a relatively
short, if not non-existent, period in the trading day.
Our objective is to explore the importance of U.S. trading for round-
the-clock price discovery, including the non-overlap. In particular, we are
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interested in how informative the non-overlap U.S. trading is and how infor-
mative U.S. prices are on the unobserved eﬃcient price during the overlap.
These issues are explored by assigning day-over-day return variance to eco-
nomically relevant intraday time intervals.
The empirical literature on round-the-clock price discovery dates back to
single market studies comparing variance ratios of open-to-close and close-
to-open returns. They generally ﬁnd trading periods to produce more in-
formation than non-trading periods (see e.g. Oldﬁeld and Rogalski (1980),
French and Roll (1986), Harvey and Huang (1991), and Jones, Kaul, and
Lipson (1994)). A natural extension of this approach to our multiple-market
setting is to single out economically relevant timepoints in the day and com-
pare return variances across time, averaged across all stocks. This approach
fails for three reasons. First, Ronen (1997) criticizes the standard variance
ratio approach as it does not account for contemporaneous correlation. Sec-
ond, microstructure literature warns that midquotes and transaction prices
are potentially noisy proxies for the unobserved eﬃcient price due to the
market making mechanism (see, e.g., Stoll (2001)). Such noise is negligible
for weekly, monthly, or annual returns, but not for intraday returns (see, e.g.,
Madhavan (2000)). The economic signiﬁcance of such noise is illustrated by
studies on the NYSE and other exchanges, which ﬁnd that 24-hour returns
based on opening prices are, on average, up to 20% more volatile than those
based on closing prices (see Forster and George (1996), Gerety and Mul-
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herin (1994), Amihud and Mendelson (1987), and Stoll and Whaley (1990)).
Such noise is potentially distorting as disproportional noise at some point in
the trading day would artiﬁcially inﬂate price discovery around that point.
Third, in our setting, variance pattern analysis involves arbitrary choices for
the price in the overlap, as we observe prices in both markets.
In this paper, we use a state space model to account for the three main
criticisms of the standard variance ratio approach. Consistent with modern
ﬁnance, we model the eﬃcient price as a random walk (see, e.g., Camp-
bell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997)). To study round-the-clock price discovery,
we endow this random walk with deterministic, time-varying volatility. In-
spired by the microstructure literature, we model the observed midquote as
the unobserved eﬃcient price plus short-term, transient noise and we allow
for potential market under- or overreaction to information (see, e.g., Ami-
hud and Mendelson (1987)). In the overlap, both midquotes are functions
of the same unobserved eﬃcient price plus idiosyncratic noise. To account
for cross-correlation in returns, we model returns as the sum of a common
and an idiosyncratic factor in the spirit of Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001). The
common factor represents macro-economic information or portfolio-wide liq-
uidity shocks (see Subrahmanyam (1991), Chowdhry and Nanda (1991),
Kumar and Seppi (1994), and Caballe and Krishnan (1994)).
The model is estimated on a 1997-1998 sample of Dutch blue chips cross-
listed in New York. The U.K. excluded, Dutch stocks are the European
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stocks that generate most volume in New York. The dataset is rich, since
it includes all trades and quotes on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as
intraday quotes on the exchange rate and intraday prices on the major Dutch
index and the S&P500.
The results demonstrate the empirical relevance of the model, as the
estimated variance pattern of the eﬃcient price innovations diﬀers signiﬁ-
cantly from the pattern based on the standard variance ratio approach. Such
an approach was pursued in earlier papers on British and Dutch cross-listed
stocks (see Werner and Kleidon (1996) and Hupperets and Menkveld (2002),
respectively). The major diﬀerence is that the variance ratio approach ﬁnds
that continued trading in New York after the Amsterdam close is signifi-
cantly more informative than the overnight period, whereas the state space
model does not. This diﬀerence is primarily due to signiﬁcant noise in
New York midquotes, which is, implicitly, assumed to be absent in the vari-
ance ratio approach. Interestingly, such noise is insigniﬁcant for Amsterdam
midquotes outside the overlap. We quantify price discovery consistent with
existing literature and ﬁnd that price discovery in Amsterdam is a factor
three higher than in New York or the overnight period. These numbers
compare to, for example, a factor seven reported for NYSE stocks compar-
ing daytime and overnight price discovery (see George and Hwang (2001)).
These results survive a number of robustness tests, including potential non-
zero correlation between transient, microstructure noise and eﬃcient price
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innovations (see, e.g., Hasbrouck (1993) and George and Hwang (2001)).
The rich model structure allows for a further characterization of round-
the-clock price discovery. First, we observe that the overlap accounts for
most information, strongest market underreaction, and signiﬁcant noise.
These ﬁndings support microstructure theory that argues that in the pres-
ence of noise traders, sophisticated, privately informed investors hide their
orders by splitting them across markets (see, e.g., Chowdhry and Nanda
(1991), Menkveld (2003)) and through time (see, e.g., Kyle (1985)). The
decomposition of information reconﬁrms this claim as the increase in in-
formation is ﬁrm-speciﬁc rather than common. Second, the decomposition
analysis further reveals that dominance shifts to common-factor information
for the New York pre-opening period. This is consistent with U.S. macro-
announcements that are published in this period. Third, the common-factor
estimates correlate higher with the local market indices outside the overlap
than during the overlap. This reinforces the ﬁnding in Chan, Hameed, and
Lau (2003) that “price ﬂuctations are aﬀected by country-speciﬁc investor
sentiment.”
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents and
discusses a multivariate state space model for midquotes of securities that
are traded in diﬀerent markets. Section 2 elaborates on trading Dutch se-
curities in Amsterdam and New York. Section 3 presents model estimates.
Section 4 contains robustness tests and a discussion of the results. Section
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5 summarizes the approach and the main conclusions.
1 Model
The principles of the analysis in this paper are based on an unobserved
“eﬃcient” price and observed midquotes in two markets that trade the same
security. State space models are a natural tool in this setting as the eﬃcient
price can be modeled as an unobservable state variable and the midquotes
as observations of this variable with measurement error to reﬂect transitory
microstructure eﬀects.
1.1 State Equations
Consistent with standard ﬁnance, we model the eﬃcient price as a random
walk with a deterministic linear trend. The process for n stocks and T
intraday timepoints can therefore be described as
αt,τ+1 = αt,τ + βft,τ + ηt,τ , τ < T, (1)
αt+1,1 = αt,T + βft,T + ηt,T , τ = T,
η
t,τ
∼ N(µ
τ
, (σητ )
2 · diag(c1, . . . , cn)),
where underlined variables are vectors in Rn, αt,τ contains the unobserved
eﬃcient prices at day t and timepoint τ , ft,τ is the unobserved common
factor, µ
τ
is the deterministic mean for intervals starting at timepoint τ ,
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and ci captures inter-stock volatility diﬀerences. For the common factor
we assume a random variable with a deterministic time-of-day dependent
variance structure
ft,τ = ξt,τ , (2)
ξt,τ ∼ N(0, (σξτ )2),
To ensure identiﬁcation of the model, we impose the following parameter
restrictions:
1
n
n∑
i=1
β2i = 1, (3)
1
n
n∑
i=1
ci = 1. (4)
These restrictions are chosen for ease of interpretation, since round-the-clock
price discovery for the “average” stock in the sample is now determined by
(σEPIτ )
2 = (σξτ )
2 + (σητ )
2, (5)
where (σEPIτ )
2 is the total variance of the Eﬃcient Price Innovation (EPI)
for the average stock.
1.2 Observation Equations
Although we do not observe the eﬃcient price, midquotes in either or both
markets at time (t, τ) are the best proxies as they do not suﬀer from the
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bid-ask bounce in transaction prices (see e.g. Roll (1986)). They are, nev-
ertheless, noisy as they suﬀer from transient microstructure eﬀects, such as
rounding errors due to discrete price grids, temporary liquidity shocks, or
inventory-management by market makers. The observation equations in our
state space model are thus speciﬁed as
pk
t,τ
= αt,τ + ε
k
t,τ , k ∈ {A,NY}, (6)
εkt,τ ∼ N(0, (σε,kτ )2 · In),
where pk
t,τ
contains midquotes for n stocks traded at market k, εkt,τ is the
transitory error due to microstructure eﬀects. The observation error vari-
ances depend on the time-of-day and on the market. They are assumed
to be equal across all stocks, an assumption that will be relaxed at a later
stage.
We extend equation (6) to allow for market under- or overreaction to in-
formation, which cannot be excluded ex-ante in high frequency analysis (see,
e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1987)). A natural way to do this is to include
a term θ(αt,τ − αt,τ−1) on the right-hand side of equation (6). This, how-
ever, does not allow us to distinguish between, for example, underreaction
to ﬁrm-speciﬁc or common factor information. We prefer the speciﬁcation
pk
t,τ
= αt,τ + θ
ξ
τ−1βft,τ−1 + θ
η
τ−1ηt,τ−1 + ε
k
t,τ , (7)
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where the common factor (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) eﬃcient price innovation up to time
τ is pre-multiplied by θξ (θη) to indicate that midquotes underreact (θ < 0)
or overreact (θ > 0) to the innovation. When we apply the model, we will
determine whether these eﬀects exist by testing the null hypothesis that θ
is equal to zero.
1.3 Estimation
The proposed model can be cast in general state space form with intra-day
periodic variances.1 The Kalman ﬁlter and associated algorithms can be
used for inference and signal extraction (see, e.g., Durbin and Koopman
(2001)). The parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood. An
important advantage of the state space model is its ability to deal with
missing values, which are paramount in this dataset, since no observations
are available on one of the exchanges during the non-overlap. The estimation
was done in Ox using SsfPack software (see Doornik (2001) and Koopman,
Shephard, and Doornik (1999)).
2 Setting: Amsterdam and New York
The volume of non-U.S. shares grew to over 15% of total NYSE volume in
2000. European shares accounted for most of this volume—approximately
one-third. Not surprisingly, U.K. shares accounted for most European vol-
ume, followed by Dutch shares that generated more volume than French
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and German shares combined. The cross-listed Dutch shares studied in this
paper are NY Registered Shares as opposed to the more common American
Depositary Receipts (ADRs). These are, however, not regarded as materi-
ally diﬀerent in the eyes of investors, according to Citibank, one of the key
players in the Depositary Services industry. Most important is that both
the NY Registered Share and the ADR can be changed for the underlying
common share at a small fee of approximately 15 basis points.
Dutch shares trade from the Amsterdam open, 3:30 EST, to the New
York close, 16:00 EST, with a one-hour trade overlap as is depicted in Fig-
ure 1. To study round-the-clock price discovery, we select 6 economically
relevant timepoints inspired by the variance patterns reported in earlier
studies (Werner and Kleidon (1996) and Hupperets and Menkveld (2002)).
The ﬁrst timepoint is 4:00, which is half an hour after the Amsterdam open.
We choose not to take the actual open as trading might not start directly,
creating a missing observation. Subsequent time points in the Amsterdam
trading period are 8:00, 9:00, and 10:00. These are, purposefully, located
around the economically interesting event times 8:30 and 9:30, since at these
times U.S. macro-announcements are published and the NYSE opens, re-
spectively. In the U.S. trading period we further select 11:00 to incorporate
the Amsterdam close and 15:30 to study price discovery during the remain-
der of the trading day. We choose to stay half an hour ahead of the close to
minimize disturbance due to last minute trading.
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The Amsterdam and the New York Stock Exchange are both continuous,
consolidated auction markets in the terminology proposed by Madhavan
(2000). Both exchanges release quote and trade information in real time.
The main diﬀerence is that New York is a hybrid market, because orders
can arrive at the ﬂoor through both brokers and the electronic Superdot
system. Amsterdam is a pure electronic market in which orders are routed
to a central market maker (“hoekman”) who manages a consolidated limit
order book and makes sure that orders are executed according to price-time
priority. Although the market maker has an obligation to “make a market”
at times of illiquidity, this is not an issue for the blue chip stocks studied in
this paper.
The dataset used in this study consists of trade and quote data from
Euronext-Amsterdam and the NYSE for July 1, 1997 through June 30,
1998. Seven Dutch blue chip stocks cross-listed in New York have been
selected for the current study: Aegon, Ahold, KLM, KPN, Philips, Royal
Dutch, and Unilever. These ﬁrms are multinationals in diﬀerent industry
groups and represent more than 50% of the local index in terms of market
capitalization.
Summary statistics for trading in the seven Dutch stocks are tabulated
in Table 1. They are very diverse as is apparent from trade variable av-
erages such as volatility, volume, and spread.2 A closer look reveals that
they are similar in two important ways. First, for none of the stocks has
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New York been able to generate more volume than Amsterdam. Second,
quoted spreads are larger in New York, up to almost 300%. This is most
likely due to the diﬀerent market structure in New York, where many orders
receive price improvement from the ﬂoor. The eﬀective spread, in this case,
is a more appropriate measure, as it is based on actual trades. Changing to
this measure, we ﬁnd that diﬀerences shrink and for some stocks New York
spreads are lower. This result should be interpreted with care, since average
trade size is higher in Amsterdam (see Hupperets and Menkveld (2002)).
Hence, the average Amsterdam trade potentially bites deeper into the limit
order book and, therefore, suﬀers a higher eﬀective spread. Although ﬁnding
the most competitive exchange is beyond the scope of this paper, eﬀective
spread results show that exchanges are very competitive, which is a promis-
ing result in view of the price discovery questions addressed in this study.
Comparing Amsterdam to New York based on statistics for the overlapping
hour yields a similar picture. The main diﬀerence is that average values for
all variables are higher during the overlap.
3 Results
As a preliminary analysis we follow the standard “variance ratio” approach
and calculate the variance pattern of intraday and overnight returns. The
intraday returns are calculated based on the six identiﬁed timepoints τi,
where we arbitrarily choose the average midquote as a proxy for the price
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during the overlap.3 Table 2 reports the variance estimates, which are trans-
lated into hourly equivalents to enable comparisons. For the three intervals
in the Amsterdam trading period, the average variance equals 3.6 · 10−5,
which corresponds to a standard deviation of 60 basispoints per hour or an
annualized volatility of 47%.4 Variance for the hour containing the Amster-
dam close is a signiﬁcant 48% higher. Consistent with existing literature, we
translate this ﬁnding into stating that price discovery—the information ﬂow
per unit of time—in this hour is a factor 1.5 higher (see, e.g., Jones, Kaul,
and Lipson (1994), French and Roll (1986), Ronen (1997), and George and
Hwang (2001)). Additionally, the Amsterdam non-overlap is a signiﬁcant
factor 2.4 more informative than the NYSE non-overlap, which, in turn, is
a signiﬁcant factor 1.3 more informative than the overnight hours.
To motivate the state space model advocated in this paper, Table 3
reports the autocorrelations for intraday returns. If measurement errors
exist and are economically signiﬁcant, we should ﬁnd negative ﬁrst order
autocorrelation. Most of these autocorrelations are indeed negative and two
of them are signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive autocorrelation for
the period containing the Amsterdam close. Apparently, markets underreact
to information in the New York open, causing persistence in returns for
the subsequent Amsterdam close period. Higher order autocorrelations are
insigniﬁcant, except for the Amsterdam close period, but this appeared to
be entirely caused by a speciﬁc day in the sample as the autocorrelation
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turns insigniﬁcant after removing that day from the analysis.
We proceed by re-estimating the intraday variance pattern using the
state space model advocated in this paper. We test for signiﬁcance of pa-
rameters at a 95% level and leave out the insigniﬁcant ones. The results
are in Table 4 and organized in three diﬀerent panels. Panel A features the
estimate of the variance pattern, which is plotted in Figure 2 along with
the variance pattern based on the direct “variance ratio” approach reported
in Table 2. The state space model estimates diﬀer in two important ways.
First, trading in New York after the Amsterdam close is not signiﬁcantly
more informative than the overnight non-trading hours. The main reasons
are that the New York midquotes contain signiﬁcant noise and that the
New York market appears to overreact signiﬁcantly (87%) to ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information. At the same time, the market underreacts to common-factor
information, but this eﬀect is much smaller (16%) and, as we will show later,
is not robust. Second, most information is attributed to the New York open
period, instead of the Amsterdam close period. The reason is market under-
reaction to both common-factor and ﬁrm-speciﬁc information (35% and 34%,
respectively) in the New York open period. In other words, the information
present in the New York open period is not yet fully revealed in midquotes
halfway through the overlapping period. This is consistent with the hypothe-
sized behavior of institutional and informed investors, who strategically split
their orders both through time and across markets in the presence of noise
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traders (see, e.g., Kyle (1985), Chowdhry and Nanda (1991)). The intuition
is that this enables them to hide their orders more easily and suﬀer less
market impact. We attribute the ﬁrm-speciﬁc underreaction to informed
investors and the common-factor underreaction to institutional investors,
who, by trading portfolios, are likely to cause commonality in order ﬂow.5
This is shown to be the major cause of commonality in returns (see Has-
brouck and Seppi (2001)). For partially overlapping markets, it is optimal
for these two types of investors to concentrate their orders in the overlap
(see Menkveld (2003)). Similarly, the market underreaction (30%) to ﬁrm-
speciﬁc information in the Amsterdam close period can be interpreted as
continued trading in New York by informed investors, who did not yet fully
exploit their information in the overlap.
To further characterize round-the-clock price discovery, we decompose in-
formation into ﬁrm-speciﬁc and common-factor information by time of day.
Figure 3 illustrates this decomposition and leads to three important observa-
tions. First, the signiﬁcantly larger innovations in the eﬃcient price during
the overlap are due to increased ﬁrm-speciﬁc rather than common-factor in-
formation. Apparently, the hypothesized order-splitting is primarily carried
out by privately informed traders, as opposed to portfolio-trading institu-
tional investors. Second, the New York preopening period is characterized
by common-factor rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. Although this pe-
riod is not signiﬁcantly more informative than the preceding Amsterdam
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trading hours, its common-factor component is signiﬁcantly higher and its
ﬁrm-speciﬁc component is signiﬁcantly lower. This is consistent with U.S.
macro-announcements in this period or, alternatively, with earnings releases
by major U.S. companies6 that potentially aﬀect market sentiment for the
oncoming U.S. trading day. Third, the “New York only” period is neither
signiﬁcantly more informative on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component, nor on the
common-factor component.
Panel B reports the estimates of the observation error variance. In the
optimization, they converge to zero for all timepoints in Amsterdam out-
side the overlap. We cannot reject the null of no observation error for these
midquotes. For New York midquotes outside the overlap, however, we do
reject the null of no observation error. During the overlap both the Ams-
terdam and the New York midquotes are signiﬁcantly noisy. The non-zero
pricing errors are interesting for two reasons. First, New York midquotes in
the overlap are signiﬁcantly noisier than Amsterdam midquotes. The esti-
mates imply a 33 basispoint standard deviation for New York errors, which
is 26% higher than Amsterdam. This, together with the non-overlap results,
is yet another sign of Amsterdam’s dominance in price discovery. The errors
are economically signiﬁcant as they are of the same magnitude as hourly ef-
ﬁcient price innovations. The New York midquote at 15:30, just ahead of
the close, is noisiest and economically signiﬁcant, since the error’s standard
deviation is more than half the standard deviation of the eﬃcient price in-
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novation over the entire NYSE non-overlap, from 11:00 to 15:30. The next
morning, just prior to the market open, one should realize that the last New
York midquote, although the most recent observation, also bears signiﬁcant
noise.
Figure 4 illustrates price discovery as it plots the estimate of the eﬃcient
price and the midquote observations for Royal Dutch. In the three-days-plot
(lower panel), we see that midquotes at the timepoints with non-zero noise
diﬀer from the eﬃcient price estimate. Particularly interesting is that the
eﬃcient price in the overlap is closer to the Amsterdam midquote than the
New York midquote. This illustrates our ﬁnding that the midquote in New
York is noisier.
Panel C reports the stock-speciﬁc parameter estimates of “beta” and
variance. For ﬁve out of seven stocks the beta estimate diﬀers signiﬁcantly
from one, which is, by construction, the sample average exposure to the
common factor. Casual comparison of these estimates with “true” betas,
as reported in, for example, the Bloomberg system, we ﬁnd a correlation
of 0.82. The correlation is not perfect, since the betas measure diﬀerent
exposures—high- versus low-frequency exposures to market-wide “shocks”
or macro factors. Cross-sectional variation is even higher for inter-stock
variance diﬀerences measured by ci as for every stock this parameter dif-
fers signiﬁcantly from one. This heterogeneity in beta and variance makes
decomposition of the total variance of eﬃcient price innovations into an id-
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iosyncratic and a common factor component, stock-speciﬁc. The general
pattern reported for the “average” stock in Figure 3 should be interpreted
carefully. Whereas it is informative on how both components, irrespective of
each other, behave through time, it is not informative on how important they
are for total variance of a speciﬁc stock. To study how this decomposition
is aﬀected, we have to inﬂate the common-factor-variance to idiosyncratic-
factor-variance ratio for stock i with β2i · c−1i . These factors are reported
in panel C and, not unexpectedly, vary signiﬁcantly across stocks. Inter-
estingly, the common-factor component is highest for Aegon, Royal Dutch,
and Unilever. This is probably due to these stocks’ high exposure to the
U.S. market in our sample period, as Aegon just took over the U.S. com-
pany Transamerica, while Royal Dutch and Unilever were members of the
S&P500.
Finally, the state space approach provides us with an estimate of the
common factor conditional on the observations, which we can compare with
local market indices—the AEX and the S&P500—for each time of day. In
Table 5 we report the correlation between the smoothed common factor
estimate and index returns. The correlation is highest, 0.57, and signiﬁcant
for the start of the trading day in Amsterdam. This is not surprising as our
stocks represent more than 50% of total market capitalization of the index
stocks in the sample period.7 It drops signiﬁcantly to 0.38 in the New York
preopening, indicating that the cross-listed stocks, collectively, start price
19
discovery less related to the remainder of the Dutch market. This eﬀect is
particularly strong for the hour containing the NYSE open, as correlation
with the AEX now drops to an insigniﬁcant 0.08. For the remainder of the
trading day, the common factor signiﬁcantly correlates with the S&P500
with correlation coeﬃcients of 0.21 and 0.28. These levels are lower than
the Amsterdam non-overlap, as these stocks, obviously, do not make up a
signiﬁcant part of the S&P500. Interestingly, the correlation with the local
market is higher outside the overlap than during the overlap. This reinforces
the ﬁnding in Chan, Hameed, and Lau (2003) that “price ﬂuctations are
aﬀected by country-speciﬁc investor sentiment.”
4 Discussion of the Results
In this section we test our ﬁndings for robustness and perform diagnostic
analysis on ﬁltered state innovations. And, we discuss the model assump-
tion that measurement error is independent of the eﬃcient price innovation,
which microstructure papers indicate might be too strong an assumption.
Although all results are discussed in this section, we only report the most
important results in tables and ﬁgures to conserve space. The results not
reported here are available through an appendix that is accessible through
the corresponding author’s website.
As our primary interest in the paper is round-the-clock price discovery,
we test robustness of the estimated intraday variance pattern in two ways.
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First, we split the sample in two subperiods and estimate the model for each
period. Second, we allow for stock-speciﬁc measurement error variances.
The results, reported in panels B and C of Table 6, show that the main
results are largely unaﬀected, i.e. the round-the-clock information pattern,
the market under- and overreaction parameters, and the signiﬁcantly noisier
NYSE prices in the overlap. The only diﬀerence is that the common-factor
underreaction to New York only trading vanishes in the second subperiod.
We base our diagnostic analysis on the scaled ﬁltered state innovations,
which should be white noise if the model is correctly speciﬁed. Figure 5
shows a plot of (i) the innovations with all stocks in consecutive order, (ii)
their empirical distribution against the standard normal, (iii) autocorrela-
tions up to the tenth lag, and (iv) autocorrelations of the squared innovations
up to the tenth lag. Innovations are heavy-tailed, a standard phenomenon in
empirical ﬁnance. Autocorrelations are insigniﬁcant. The autocorrelations
of squared returns are positive, indicating GARCH eﬀects, but small. Fur-
ther inspection using scatterplots, however, shows that this may be spurious
as they seem to be driven by a few relatively large observations. Though
accounting for stochastic volatility might aﬀect the estimates of the conﬁ-
dence intervals, it is unlikely to change the deterministic intraday variance
pattern (see Andersen, Bollerslev, and Das (2001)).
The assumed independence of the eﬃcient price innovation and the mea-
surement error seems at odds with common microstructure models. In a
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standard structural model, the transaction price at time t equals the sum
of an eﬃcient price and a linear expression in signed volume of the previous
two trades (see, e.g., George and Hwang (2001)). Since the innovation in
the eﬃcient price is a linear function of the same signed volumes (plus ad-
ditional terms), the independence assumption for εkt,τ and ηt,τ in our state
space model could be violated. Ideally, we would relax the assumption to
test the robustness of our results, but this is, econometrically, not possible as
the model would become underidentiﬁed (see Hasbrouck (1993)). Instead,
we argue it is unlikely that the issue impacts our main results for three
reasons. First, we model midquotes instead of transaction prices, which
eliminates one of the signed volume terms in the “transaction price” equa-
tion. Second, the remaining signed volume term relates to the cost for a
single market maker to carry inventory through time. This is not an issue
for the Amsterdam market as it is fully electronic and highly liquid, so that
virtually all trades are executed without the intervention of the designated
market maker (“hoekman”).8 In New York, the market maker (“specialist”)
is an active intermediary, but Madhavan and Soﬁanos (1998) document that
market makers “control their inventory positions by selectively timing the
size and direction of their trades rather than by adjusting their quotes.”9.
Third, panel D in Table 6 shows that the main results are not aﬀected by
pre-setting the correlation to 0.175, which is our best guess based on George
and Hwang (2001)).10
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5 Conclusion
This paper studies round-the-clock price discovery for cross-listed stocks
in markets that do not fully overlap. We propose a state space model for
multiple stocks with an eﬃcient price as the unobserved state and midquotes
as observations. Compared to other approaches, the model’s appeal lies in
its ability to deal naturally with (i) simultaneous quotes in an overlapping
period, (ii) missing observations in the non-overlap, (iii) noise due to short-
term microstructure eﬀects, and (iv) contemporaneous correlation in returns
due to common market-wide factors. As a matter of fact, our speciﬁcation
enables us to estimate the common factor return, conditional on the data.
We compare it to the return on the local market indices to ﬁnd out to what
extent the common factor mirrors these indices.
We exploit a rich dataset on Dutch stocks cross-listed at the NYSE with
tick data on trades, quotes, exchange rates, and both local market indices.
We ﬁnd that the overlapping period is the most important period in 24-hour
price discovery, followed by the “Amsterdam only” period. Least important
are the “New York only” and the overnight period, which, perhaps surpris-
ingly, are equally informative. Further evidence of the NYSE’s minor role in
price discovery is the signiﬁcant noise in midquotes throughout the trading
day. Amsterdam midquotes, however, are not noisy outside the overlap and
signiﬁcantly less noisy during the overlap. The round-the-clock price dis-
covery process can be further analyzed by decomposing the information by
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time-of-day into a ﬁrm-speciﬁc and a common-factor component. We ﬁnd
that it is ﬁrm-speciﬁc information that causes the overlap to be relatively
more informative. Interestingly, we also ﬁnd that the NYSE preopening
period is characterized by common-factor information, consistent with U.S.
macro-announcements that are published in this period. Further study of
the common-factor estimate reveals that it correlates highly with the Dutch
market index in early Amsterdam hours, but this correlation decreases sub-
stantially in the course of the day, as we get closer to the start of trading
in New York. The correlation is low and insigniﬁcant around the New York
open, indicating that the cross-listed stocks exhibit common price discov-
ery independent of the rest of the home market. During New York trading
hours, the common factor signiﬁcantly correlates with the S&P500. Again,
this correlation is lower during the overlap than outside the overlap. These
ﬁndings suggest that eﬃcient price innovations are driven by country-speciﬁc
investor sentiment (see, e.g., Chan, Hameed, and Lau (2003)).
Notes
1If we deﬁne a new state variable α˜ as
α˜t,τ = αt,τ + θ
ξ
τ−1βft,τ−1 + θ
η
τ−1ηt,τ−1, (8)
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we can rewrite the system of equations in (1) and (7) as
α˜t,τ+1 = α˜t,τ + (1 + θ
ξ
τ )βft,τ + (1 + θ
η
τ )ηt,τ (9)
−θξτ−1
1 + θξτ−1
(1 + θξτ−1)βft,τ−1 +
−θητ−1
1 + θητ−1
(1 + θητ−1)ηt,τ−1,
pk
t,τ
= α˜t,τ + ε
k
t,τ .
By straightforward re-parametrization, we ﬁnd
α˜t,τ+1 = α˜t,τ + βf˜t,τ + η˜t,τ + θ˜
ξ
τ−1βf˜t,τ−1 + θ˜
η
τ−1η˜t,τ−1, (10)
pk
t,τ
= α˜t,τ + ε
k
t,τ ,
where f˜t,τ ≡ (1 + θξτ )ft,τ , η˜t,τ ≡ (1 + θ
η
τ )ηt,τ , θ˜
ξ
τ ≡ −θ
ξ
τ
1+θξτ
, and θ˜ητ ≡ −θ
η
τ
1+θητ
.
2You ﬁnd the deﬁnition of these variables are described in the caption of
the table.
3For all estimates reported in this paper “outliers” were removed for
diﬀerent reasons. First, in 1998 the change to daylight savings time in the
Netherlands happened one week before the U.S. As a result, there was no
trading overlap from March 30 to April 3, 1998. This period was removed
from the sample as it is not representative. Second, at the end of the trading
day on October 27, New York prices collapsed by 7%. They fully recovered at
the New York open the next day. This overnight period was removed from
the sample as it was a clear temporary distortion. Third, on a Unilever
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quarterly announcement on May 1, 1998, the share price jumped by roughly
8% on the Amsterdam open. This jump was removed as it clearly was
a one-time event and not representative for regular round-the-clock price
discovery.
4We do realize, however, that for the ﬁrst interval from 4:00 to 8:00,
variance is skewed towards the ﬁrst two hours after the opening, consistent
with the stylized fact of an intraday U-shape in volatility. We still aggregate
these trading hours into one period, as we are primarily interested in the
role of both markets in round-the-clock price discovery, which motivates
the proposed time periods. This is consistent with existing literature that
studies average hourly price discovery for trading and non-trading periods by
aggregating the full trading period and studying variances of open-to-close
returns and close-to-open returns (see, e.g., Oldﬁeld and Rogalski (1980),
French and Roll (1986), Harvey and Huang (1991), and Jones, Kaul, and
Lipson (1994))
5We do not claim that these two investor types do not overlap. On the
contrary, privately informed investors are oftentimes institutional investors.
6These releases are typically published before the market opens, so as to
give investors time to read and analyze them.
7The weight these stocks have in the Dutch market index (AEX), how-
ever, is far less as the index is not weighted by market capitalization.
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8This was conﬁrmed by an exchange oﬃcial.
9This explains the weak inventory eﬀects documented for the NYSE in
Madhavan and Smidt (1993) and Hasbrouck and Soﬁanos (1993)
10 George and Hwang (2001) report that 9% of the transitory component
(“measurement error”) variance and 34% of the permanent component (“ef-
ﬁcient price innovation”) is due to signed volume. Following microstructure
theory, we assume all correlation between the two components is caused by
signed volume. Based on these observations, we estimate the correlation
at 0.175. This is easily seen by writing down a simultaneous model of the
transitory (t) and the permanent (p) component:
t = c+ ε, ε ⊥ c,
p = αc+ η, η ⊥ c, η ⊥ ε.
The correlation between t and p is now easily calculated as:
ρt,p =
cov(t, p)
σtσp
=
ασ2c√
1
0.34σc
√
1
0.09ασc
=
√
0.09 · 0.34 ≈ ±0.175.
As we can exclude a negative signed volume eﬀect, because we use midquotes
and not transaction prices, the remaining signed volume eﬀect for “inventory
reasons” suggests a positive sign, i.e. +0.175.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics Trading Amsterdam and New York
This table contains summary statistics for trading in Amsterdam and New York from July
1, 1997, through June 30, 1998. Panel A contains averages for the full trading day; panel
B for the overlapping hour. All variables are 15-minute averages. Trade Price Volatility
is calculated as the variance of the 15-minute squared returns based on transaction prices
and measured in basispoints. Midquote Volatility is calculated the same way, but based
on midquotes. Quoted Spread is calculated as the time-weighted average of all prevailing
quoted spreads in a 15-minute interval. Eﬀective Spread is calculated as the time-weighted
average of twice the diﬀerence between the transaction price and the prevailing midquote.
Both spreads are measured in basispoints. Volume is the 15-minute average number of
shares traded.
Panel A: Trading Statistics Full Day (15-minute averages)
Share
AEG AHO KLM KPN PHG RD UN
Trade Price AMS 922 1,360 1,284 1,005 1,412 730 581
Volatility (bp2) NY 336 1,214 753 376 808 859 493
Midquote AMS 544 1,076 929 642 1,118 600 438
Volatility (bp2) NY 274 799 686 390 743 914 533
Quoted AMS 23 40 37 32 25 20 18
Spread (bp) NY 51 106 66 90 38 44 19
Eﬀective AMS 18 26 28 25 18 15 14
Spread (bp) NY 19 49 32 35 15 15 13
Volume AMS 34 89 20 53 77 139 57
(1,000 shares) NY 3 1 6 1 24 72 20
Panel B: Trading Statistics Overlapping Hour (15-minute averages)
Share
AEG AHO KLM KPN PHG RD UN
Trade Price AMS 1,437 2,116 2,321 1,779 2,096 1,017 966
Volatility (bp2) NY 933 2,007 1,840 733 1,508 1,291 619
Midquote AMS 1,038 1,708 1,949 1,325 1,783 897 827
Volatility (bp2) NY 888 1,466 1,679 815 1,553 1,284 710
Quoted AMS 23 41 36 31 25 21 20
Spread (bp) NY 61 120 83 90 44 47 20
Eﬀective AMS 20 28 32 28 20 17 16
Spread (bp) NY 51 82 58 83 33 17 21
Volume AMS 53 124 33 81 123 232 95
(1,000 shares) NY 5 3 11 2 38 120 34
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Table 2: Hourly Variance for Intraday and Overnight Returns
This table contains estimates of the midquote return variance for diﬀerent intraday time
intervals based on July 1, 1997, through June 30, 1998. All stocks are included. Midquote
returns for are ﬁrst demeaned by subtracting the time-proportional average mean over the
entire sample and then scaled to correct for inter-stock volatility diﬀerences. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
Time Intervals, τi − τi+1
Event Start
AMS
NY
PreOpen
NY
Open
AMS
Close
NY
Only
Over-
night
Start (EST) 4:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 15:30
End 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 15:30 4:00
σ2τ 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.53 0.15 0.12
(*10,000) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00)
Table 3: Intraday Return Autocorrelations
This table presents the raw return autocorrelations up to the second lag of intraday and
overnight midquote returns. The midquote in the overlapping interval was arbitrarily
ﬁxed at the average of the Amsterdam and New York midquote. The autocorrelations
are calculated for the full sample period, from July 1, 1997, through June 30, 1998,
and averaged across all stocks. We explicitly account for commonality in returns when
determining conﬁdence intervals.
Time Interval Event Lag 1 Lag 2
4:00-8:00 AMS Only -0.077
8:00-9:00 NY PreOpen 0.056 -0.020
9:00-10:00 NY Open -0.125∗ -0.005
10:00-11:00 AMS Close 0.251∗ -0.170∗
11:00-15:30 NY Only -0.050 0.039
15:30-4:00(+1) Overnight -0.165∗ -0.022
∗: Signiﬁcant at a 95% conﬁdence level.
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Table 4: State Space Model Estimation Results
This table contains maximum likelihood estimates of the state space model based on
intraday midquotes for the period from July 1, 1997, through June 30, 1998. All stocks
are included. The model deﬁnition is
αt,τ+1 = αt,τ + βft,τ + ηt,τ , ηt,τ ∼N(µτ ,(σ
η
τ )
2 · diag(c1, . . . , c7)),
ft,τ = ξt,τ , ξt,τ ∼N(0 ,(σξτ )2),
pk
t,τ
= αt,τ + θ
ξ
τ−1βft,τ−1 + θ
η
τ−1ηt,τ−1 + ε
k
t,τ , ε
k
t,τ ∼N(0 ,(σε,kτ )2 · I),
where underlined variables are vectors in R7, pk
t,τ
is a vector containing the midquotes
for all stocks on exchange k at day t and timepoint τ , αt,τ is the unobserved eﬃcient
price, ft,τ is the unobserved common factor, and θτ represent the potential under- or
overreactions (θ <0, θ > 0, respectively) of midquotes to innovations. (σEPIτ )
2 is the
total variance of the eﬃcient price innovation and thus is the sum of (σξτ )
2 and (σητ )
2, β
is the common factor loading, c controls for volatility diﬀerences across stocks, and µ
τ
is
the time-proportional average return over the sample period. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
Panel A: Variance Eﬃcient Price Innovation (*10,000, Hourly)
Time Intervals, τi − τi+1
Event Start
AMS
NY
PreOpen
NY
Open
AMS
Close
NY
Only
Over-
night
Start (EST) 4:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 15:30
End 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 15:30 4:00
(σEPIτ )
2 0.35 0.33 0.43 0.38 0.09 0.10
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
(σξτ )
2 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
θξτ −0.35 −0.16
(0.04) (0.04)
(σητ )2 0.22 0.15 0.27 0.23 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
θητ −0.34 −0.30 0.87
(0.02) (0.08) (0.13)
Panel B: Variance Measurement Error (*10,000)
Time Points, τi, (EST)
4:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 15:30
(σε,Aτ )
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
(σε,NYτ )2 0.11 0.07 0.14
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
– Continued on next page –
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– Continued from previous page –
Panel C: Other Parameters
Share
AEG AHO KLM KPN PHG RD UN
β 0.98 1.23 0.87 0.87 1.11 1.00 0.88
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
c 0.55 1.21 1.54 0.67 1.83 0.75 0.46
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03)
β2 · c−1 1.75 1.25 0.49 1.12 0.68 1.34 1.68
(0.16) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.15)
Table 5: Correlation Common Factor and Market Index
This table contains the correlations between the (smoothed) common factor estimate of
the state space model and intraday returns on the AEX index and the S&P500 indices for
diﬀerent intraday time intervals. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Time Intervals, τi − τi+1
Event Start
AMS
NY
PreOpen
NY
Open
AMS
Close
NY
Only
Start (EST) 4:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00
End 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 15:30
ρ(Common Factor, AEX) 0.57 0.38 0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
ρ(Common Factor, S&P500) 0.21 0.28
(0.07) (0.07)
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